El artículo trata de acometer una aproximación intelectual al concepto de teoría conspirativa, a fin de explorar tentativamente posibles cartografías para una adecuada comprensión de su significatividad y pregnancia contemporáneas. Para ello, se procederá a un somero repaso de las aportaciones recientes al estudio de las teorías conspirativas desde una pluralidad de disciplinas (estudios culturales, teoría política, psicoanálisis, psicología social o filosofía) y a una exploración de sus mecanismos de funcionamiento y sus posibles funciones dentro del campo de fuerzas configurado (...) alrededor de la relación existente entre neoliberalismo y populismo. Finalmente, se propone una concepción de la teoría conspirativa contemporánea como una forma de teodicea, en cuanto a que cumple funciones de explicación del mal y de desplazamiento de la responsabilidad. (shrink)

I discuss three recent counterexamples to the transitivity of grounding due to Jonathan Schaffer. I argue that the counterexamples don’t work and draw some conclusions about the relationship between grounding and explanation.

A logic of grounding where what is grounded can be a collection of truths is a “many-many” logic of ground. The idea that grounding might be irreducibly many-many has recently been suggested by Dasgupta. In this paper I present a range of novel philosophical and logical reasons for being interested in many-many logics of ground. I then show how Fine’s State-Space semantics for the Pure Logic of Ground can be extended to the many-many case, giving rise to the Pure Logic (...) of Many-Many Ground. In the second, more technical, part of the paper, I do two things. First, I present an alternative formalization of plg; this allows us to simplify Fine’s completeness proof for plg. Second, I formalize plmmg using an infinitary sequent calculus and prove that this formalization is sound and complete. (shrink)

Preface This volume represents the proceedings of the Second Conference on Situation Theory and its Applications, held at Loch Rannoch, Scotland, ...

Could φ’s partially grounding ψ itself be a partial ground for ψ? I show that it follows from commonly accepted principles in the logic of ground that this sometimes happens. It also follows from commonly accepted principles that this never happens. I show that this inconsistency turns on different principles than the puzzles of ground already discussed in the literature, and I propose a way of resolving the inconsistency.

Using only uncontentious principles from the logic of ground I construct an infinitely descending chain of ground without a lower bound. I then compare the construction to the constructions due to Dixon and Rabin and Rabern.

Much attention has been focused in recent years on the ethical acceptability of physicians receiving gifts from drug companies. Professional guidelines recognize industry gifts as a conflict of interest and establish thresholds prohibiting the exchange of large gifts while expressly allowing for the exchange of small gifts such as pens, note pads, and coffee. Considerable evidence from the social sciences suggests that gifts of negligible value can influence the behavior of the recipient in ways the recipient does not always realize. (...) Policies and guidelines that rely on arbitrary value limits for gift-giving or receipt should be reevaluated. (shrink)

Seemingly natural principles about the logic of ground generate cycles of ground; how can this be if ground is asymmetric? The goal of the theory of decycling is to find systematic and principled ways of getting rid of such cycles of ground. In this paper—drawing on graph-theoretic and topological ideas—I develop a general framework in which various theories of decycling can be compared. This allows us to improve on proposals made earlier by Fine and Litland. However, it turns out that (...) there is no unique method of decycling. An important upshot is that the notion of asymmetric ground may be indeterminate. (shrink)

The Recursive Bayesian Net (RBN) formalism was originally developed for modelling nested causal relationships. In this paper we argue that the formalism can also be applied to modelling the hierarchical structure of mechanisms. The resulting network contains quantitative information about probabilities, as well as qualitative information about mechanistic structure and causal relations. Since information about probabilities, mechanisms and causal relations is vital for prediction, explanation and control respectively, an RBN can be applied to all these tasks. We show in particular (...) how a simple two-level RBN can be used to model a mechanism in cancer science. The higher level of our model contains variables at the clinical level, while the lower level maps the structure of the cell's mechanism for apoptosis. (shrink)

The orthodox view in statistics has it that frequentism and Bayesianism are diametrically opposed—two totally incompatible takes on the problem of statistical inference. This paper argues to the contrary that the two approaches are complementary and need to mesh if probabilistic reasoning is to be carried out correctly.

Tome I: Afrikaans to Dutch -- Tome II: English -- Tome III: Estonian to Hebrew -- Tome IV: Hungarian to Korean -- Tome V: Latvian to Ukrainian -- Tome VI: Figures A-H -- Tome VII: Figures I-Z.

This paper examines corporate social responsibility in Japan today within the context of the paradigm of the moral unity of business. Under this paradigm, business is expected to operate under the same set of moral standards operative in other societal institutions. We suggest that a micro moral unity characterizes Japan—business activity is linked to that society’s moral values but only within carefully circumscribed communities of interest. Because of the strains brought on by the maturing of the Japanese economy, the negative (...) consequences of this micro moral unity are now becoming apparent. A new paradigm will be required to address thesechallenges. A possible foundation for such a paradigm, based on the emerging notion of kyosei (living and working together for the common good), is discussed. (shrink)

In the early 1990s there emerged a growing interest with the concept of epistemic entitlement. Philosophers who acknowledge the existence of entitlements maintain that there are beliefs or judgments unsupported by evidence available to the subject, but which the subject nonetheless has the epistemic right to hold. Some of these may include beliefs non-inferentially sourced in perception, memory, introspection, testimony, and the a priori. Unlike the traditional notion of justification, entitlement is often characterized as an externalist type of epistemic warrant, (...) in the sense that a subject’s being entitled is determined by facts and circumstances that are independent of any reasoning capacities she may or may not have, and which the subject herself need not understand or be able to recognize. One key motivation for this view is that the inclusion of entitlement in epistemology can account for the commonly held intuition that largely unreflective individuals, such as children and non-human animals, possess warrant and basic knowledge about the world. It also paves the way for a tenable foundationalist epistemology, according to which there exist warranted beliefs which are not themselves warranted or justified by any further beliefs. This article explores theories of entitlement as presented by four prominent philosophers: Fred Dretske, Tyler Burge, Crispin Wright, and Christopher Peacocke. (shrink)

The publication of Political Liberalismhas allowed John Rawls to bring to the fore issues that remained in the background of A Theory of Justice. His explicit attention to the concept of ‘the reasonable’ is a welcome development. In a more recent publication, he affirms the importance of this concept, ‘while [granting] that the idea of the reasonable needs a more thorough examination than Political Liberalism offers.’ In this paper, I will present a critical exposition of the senses of the reasonable (...) on which justice as fairness relies. Rawls employs the term in four main contexts. I will outline these various senses and argue that in each case, a controversy in the secondary literature can be resolved by close attention to the concept of the reasonable. In three of these contexts, Rawls relies on what I will call a ‘strong’ sense of the reasonable, while in one he sometimes seems to rely on a ‘weak’ sense. I argue that justice as fairness is best served by relying on a strong sense throughout. (shrink)

In “Proof-Theoretic Justification of Logic”, building on work by Dummett and Prawitz, I show how to construct use-based meaning-theories for the logical constants. The assertability-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their introduction rules; the consequence-conditional meaning-theory takes the meaning of the logical constants to be given by their elimination rules. I then consider the question: given a set of introduction rules \, what are the strongest elimination rules that are validated by an assertability (...) conditional meaning-theory based on \? I prove that the intuitionistic introduction rules are the strongest rules that are validated by the intuitionistic elimination rules. I then prove that intuitionistic logic is the strongest logic that can be given either an assertability-conditional or consequence-conditional meaning-theory. In “Grounding Grounding” I discuss the notion of grounding. My discussion revolves around the problem of iterated grounding-claims. Suppose that \ grounds \; what grounds that \ grounds that \? I argue that unless we can get a satisfactory answer to this question the notion of grounding will be useless. I discuss and reject some proposed accounts of iterated grounding claims. I then develop a new way of expressing grounding, propose an account of iterated grounding-claims and show how we can develop logics for grounding. In “Is the Vagueness Argument Valid?” I argue that the Vagueness Argument in favor of unrestricted composition isn’t valid. However, if the premisses of the argument are true and the conclusion false, mereological facts fail to supervene on non-mereological facts. I argue that this failure of supervenience is an artifact of the interplay between the necessity and determinacy operators and that it does not mean that mereological facts fail to depend on non-mereological facts. I sketch a deflationary view of ontology to establish this. (shrink)

The claim that corporations are not people is perhaps the most frequently voiced criticism of the United States Supreme Court decision Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. There is something obviously correct about this claim. While the nature and extent of obligations with respect to group agents like corporations and labor unions is far from clear, it is manifest in moral understanding and deeply embedded in legal practice that there is no general requirement to treat them like natural persons. Group (...) agents may be denied rights to marry, vote, or run for public office. More generally the need to guard against discrimination, the core injustice in racism and sexism, has no direct application to the case of group agents. There is also something obviously incorrect about the claim that corporations are not people. The legal practice of treating some group agents as persons under law is ancient, found already in Roman law at the time of Justinian. In this essay I propose that reflection on this tension reveals that fundamental revision to the doctrine of legal personhood is needed. More specifically I propose that legal personhood be decomposed into at least two elements—standing and liability—and that legal systems reject the principle that an entity possesses one just in case it possesses the other. The import of this change ramifies broadly. Decomposing legal personhood not only enables a satisfactory account of the status of corporations and labor unions, who as such have liability but not standing, it also enables a satisfactory account of the status of those who as such have standing but not liability: severely mentally disabled persons, very young children, and non-human animals with phenomenal consciousness but lacking capacities to understand reasons and justifications. (shrink)

This paper provides a game-theoretic analysis of contrastive focus, extending insights from recent work on the role of noisy communication in prosodic accent placement to account for focus within sentences, sub-sentential phrases and words. The shared insight behind these models is that languages with prosodic focus marking assign prosodic prominence only within elements which constitute material critical for successful interpretation. We first take care to distinguish the information-structural notion of focus from an ontologically distinct notion of givenness marking, and then (...) outline the core properties of focus. We then introduce a signaling game between a speaker and hearer in which the goal is to transmit semantic content with the smallest signal possible. We apply the Iterated Best Response method of Franke to find equilibrium strategies in this game, where a unique equilibrium strategy in this case picks out the “critical information” of an utterance, which by hypothesis constitutes its focus. We show that iterating this game at different syntactic levels of a sentence makes correct predictions about the role of contrast in determining stress within words and phrases, and can be extended to account for association and second occurrence focus effects. (shrink)

With contributions by scholars from different religions and specializations, this volume explores the potential of nondualism as a fundamentally unifying concept. In every case, we find that nondualism is universal in its relevance yet distinctive and original in its contribution.

I argue that Newtonian-style deduction-from-the-phenomena arguments should only carry conviction when they yield unexpectedly simple conclusions. That in that case they do establish higher rational probabilities for the theories they lead to than for any known or easily constructible rival theories. However I deny that such deductive justifications yield high absolute rational probabilities, and argue that the history of physics suggests that there are always other not-yet-known simpler theories with higher rational probabilities on all the original evidence, and that these (...) later turn out closer to the truth. My analyses rely on the modern Solomonoff-Levin solution to the problem of constructing a mathematically and philosophically acceptable inductive logic. (shrink)

MORE THAN MOST PHILOSOPHERS, Spinoza needed a coherent and sophisticated set of views on the nature of possibility: many of his most important philosophical positions and arguments depended on it. As one example, take Ethics IP33. This Proposition—among the most famous of the Ethics— states, “Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than they have been produced.” In a salutary attempt to clarify the meaning of IP33 et relata, Spinoza adds in (...) the first Scholium to IP33 that “by these propositions I have shown more clearly than the noon light that there is absolutely nothing in things on account of which they can be called contingent.” Now, such assertions were bound to give rise to numerous objections and Spinoza knew it. To meet these objections, he immediately proceeds to one of the most powerful: namely, are there not things that actually have been “produced by God” that need not have been “produced by God?” And would it not make sense to call these things “contingent or possible?” In reply, Spinoza reinterprets the concept of possibility. We call existing things “contingent” “only because of a defect of our knowledge.” There are, he continues, two types of deficiency that lead us to regard existing things as “contingent or possible”: either we do not know “that the thing’s essence involves a contradiction” or we do know that the thing’s essence does not involve a contradiction but we do not know enough about the “order of causes” to affirm anything “certainly about its existence.”. (shrink)

This chapter addresses two questions: what are causal relationships? how can one discover causal relationships? I provide a survey of the principal answers given to these questions, followed by an introduction to my own view, epistemic causality, and then a comparison of epistemic causality with accounts provided by Judea Pearl and Huw Price.

Frederic Fitch’s celebrated reasoning to the conclusion that all truths are known can be interpreted as a reductio of the claim that all truths are knowable. Given this, nearly all of the proof’s reception has involved canvassing the prospects for some form of verificationism. Unfortunately, debates of this sort discount much of the philosophical import of the proof. In addition to its relevance for verificationism, Fitch’s proof is also an argument for the existence of God, one at least as strong (...) as the traditional demonstrations. Perhaps unlike other such proofs, Fitch’s also operates as a key lemma in a proof that establishes that God can’t exist. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the views that for purposes of distributive justice, groups don't matter and the past doesn't matter. Justice is concerned with living individuals and with future individuals. The view that groups don't matter I call ethical individualism. The view that the past doesn't matter I call ethical presentism. I apologize for the neologism. It is not only ugly, but inaccurate, given my concern with future individuals. A better but even uglier term, would be “ethical non-past-ism.”.

Few activities divide the environmental community the way that hunting does. Opponents decry its cruelty and failure to respect animal rights, while hunting advocates cite the necessity of controlling populations of game and the naturalness of humans functioning as predators. This debate is both emotional and fiercely intellectual with environmental philosophers waging wars of words to match the protests by PETA and other anti-hunting groups. Perhaps Edward Abbey said it best: "Hunting is one of the hardest things even to think (...) about" But think about it we must Millions of Americans hunt, killing hundreds of millions of animals every year. The morality of hunting is precisely the sort of question that any environmental ethic must address. (shrink)

Scorned by analytic philosophers for much of the twentieth century, the a priori has been newly befriended in recent years. This development is healthy but there is reason to be concerned about how it is unfolding. In particular, it is largely characterized by a certain historical myopia: contemporary philosophers are able to see back to Kant but not much beyond him. While it may be true that the a priori changed with Kant, this in itself provides us with a reason (...) to go back before him. For other conceptualizations of the a priori, all but forgotten now, might help us to meet worries about it that Kant's familiar version cannot. (shrink)

En el cristianismo, un elemento se eleva por sobre los demás en su darse: la gracia, dación gratuita que Dios otorga a su criatura. Principalmente, la gracia se entiende y estudia como aquel don dado a la naturaleza de la criatura para su complementación o perfección. Sin embargo, el tema no encuentra su agotamiento ahí, pues la gracia también puede ser dispensada para la finalización de un designio intrahistórico, tal como narran los Evangelios.

ABSTRACTCritical Theory and contemporary psychoanalytic perspectives share many compatibilities in offering a constructive critique of society. Psychoanalysis teaches us that whatever values and ideals societies adopt, they are always mediated through unconscious psychic processes that condition the collective in both positive and negative ways, and in terms of relations of recognition and patterns of social justice. Contemporary critical theory may benefit from engaging post-classical and current trends in psychoanalytic thought that have direct bearing on the ways we conceive of and (...) observe how individuals operate within social collectives. In particular, Axel Honneth relies on psychoanalytic sources that are dated. Critical theory would profit from engaging post-object relations schools such as self psychology, analytical psychology, psychoanalytic intersubjectivity theory, relationality, and contemporary attachment theory that are more nuanced yet can supplement Winnicottian perspectives. Implications for contemporary theory need to reflect upon how the psychosocial matrix of self and society both facilitate and hinder optimal social arrangements and fabrics of justice as it takes up the question of normativity. It is within this context that I hope to introduce contemporary psychoanalytic paradigms that move beyond classical models yet complement redirecting shifts in emphasis both psychoanalysis and Critical Theory attempt to accomplish. I suggest that an applied psychoanalytic explication on social phenomenology can expand the interpretive depth and breadth of human relations and open up a permissible space for interdisciplinary discourse. Here new vistas emerge for a proposed synthesis between the two schools of thought. (shrink)

This paper examines a number of questions about the degree to which the clinical practice of medicine is affected, if at all, by the legal systems in four countries: Chile, Germany, Japan and the United States. The focus on these four countries in four different regions of the world offers a unique perspective within which to examine medical treatment decisions made by patients and their proxies or surrogates, the potential role for universal written instruments such as advance directives, the cross-professional (...) tensions between clinical and legal concerns in very distinct cultures, and the degree to which legal activities can change or affect clinical realities in the context of these different political and health care systems. We have incorporated, whenever relevant, the insights of many disciplines, including the social sciences, in analyzing the existing interrelations between law and behavior in this specific context. Der Beitrag untersucht, inwieweit die klinische Praxis in vier Ländern mit unterschiedlichen Rechtssystemen und Berufskulturen durch Rechtsnormen oder das Verständnis von Recht beeinflußt wird. Es wird gefragt, welche Funktion rechtliche Interventionen bei der Veränderung von Verhaltensnormen in unterschiedlichen Gesundheitssystemen haben können. Folgende Themenbereiche werden diskutiert: Entscheidungen über die medizinische Behandlung, die von Patienten und ihren Angehörigen oder Stellvertretern getroffen werden; die mögliche Rolle umfassender schriftlicher Verfügungen wie z.B. der Patiententestamente ; die berufsübergreifenden Spannungen zwischen medizinischen und rechtlichen Belangen in sehr unterschiedlichen Kulturen; der Einfluß, den gesetzgeberische Aktivitäten im Kontext der verschiedenen politischen und Gesundheitssysteme auf die medizinische Wirklichkeit haben. Bei ihrer Analyse der in diesem Zusammenhang bestehenden Beziehungen im Verhältnis von Recht und Verhalten haben die Autoren die Erkenntnisse vieler Disziplinen unter Einschluß der Sozialwissenschaften, soweit sie als relevant erscheinen, in ihren Beitrag eingearbeitet. (shrink)